The Iraq situation - text of a speech given in Southampton.

We are meeting tonight after what by any reckoning is the largest march London has seen. It was saying no war. In that sense it was straightforward. The difficulty of interpreting some marches is that they are not what they seem - the half million countryside alliance march - allegedly about life and livelihood in the countryside turned out to be a march that didn't want foxhunting banned.

The march also said another straightforward thing. It said it was a coalition. Indeed it was.

There were I think within the march, and within the British public as a whole some different positions under the 'no war' banner.

Some people want no action at all taken against Saddam. A few in that group do so because they believe Saddam is not the nasty dictator he has been made out to be, but many more accept he is, but are against military conflict under all circumstances.

Some people think it is hypocrisy to claim to want to do something about Iraq whilst not doing anything about Palestine, North Korea, Zimbabwe and perhaps, some say China.

Some people want to do something about Iraq but believe it can be achieved by peaceful means, and should only be pursued by peaceful means.

Some people want to do something about Iraq and accept that there might be conflict but consider it is only possible to envisage this as a result of action sanctioned by the United Nations.

Some of course not on the march, want there to be a war, and want it to be led by the United States, regardless of what anyone else says. There seem mercifully few people who think that way in the UK - and a worryingly larger number in the United States.

So where should we stand, and what should we do?

I have to reject straight away the position, honourably held, that we should never contemplate the possibility of armed conflict. I am deliberately not going to mention 1939 here - I don't think historical mix and matching is very helpful here - but yes, the international community should have done something about Uganda, about Rwanda, and about Cambodia - and they didn't. Action in Kosovo and, I think Afghanistan was right, although it involved civilian casualties and military conflict.

And it is true that Saddam is one of the nastiest dictators we presently have around. It is true that he has bombed gassed, tortured, murdered and expelled large numbers of his own people, and has at various times threatened or invaded most of the states around him. It is true that he has had, and probably now has, substantial supplies of chemical and biological weapons and has systematically attempted to mount a military nuclear programme. I think it is also true that the people of Iraq have no love for Saddam, and if he were deposed there would be rejoicing among most of the population. but that is not the position of the United Nations in 1991, and nor is it now.

And of course it is true that the default position, as it were, is that the UN has been attempting to do something, effectively since 1991, when Iraq was given fifteen days to comply with the demand that its weapons of mass destruction should be disposed of. Twelve years later that has not happened, and in passing resolution 1441 the UN signalled its renewed resolve, and that is why the weapons inspectors are in Iraq now. So to do nothing at all would by the by, row back on that position,

So is it hypocritical to do something about Iraq right now? Well yes, it is, partially. I for one, observe the continued repression of the Palestinians by Israel with mounting anger, and strongly hold the view that international action to secure a territorially integral Palestinian state must be high on the international agenda ideally through the medium of the United Nations.

But the fact that we do not do something about everything does not mean that we should do nothing about anything. There is a strong case - as I have said a live case - underway through the UN to do something about Iraq, and we need to take that case seriously in its own right.

So if we agree that something should be done, what might that be and how might action be successful?

Clearly the best outcome is that the weapons inspectors do their work with co-operation from Iraq, that weapons of mass destruction are disposed of, and that Iraq agrees not to pursue that path again. That is possible. Saddam could make that happen.

But of course, the only reason the weapons inspectors are in the country at all is because resolution 1441 made a threat - it stated that 'serious consequences' would follow if Iraq did not now comply with the undertaking it had previously given and which were the subject of previous UN resolutions. I personally doubt whether any weapons inspectors would be in the country at all - and with them the prospect of a peaceful outcome to the crisis, if that threat had not been made. Quite frankly, Saddam has proved himself a past master at obfuscation, evasion and procrastination over a twelve-year period. So I don't think contemplating only peaceful means to resolve the crisis is tenable - and if it were, it might consist of years of sanctions and other actions which would further damage the people of Iraq without damaging very much the members of the regime responsible for the position.

I also don't think so because making a threat implies that you might carry it out - and to have any hope of resolving matters peacefully it is necessary for Saddam to believe that the threat might be carried out. Many think that the presence of troops now around Iraq means that war is inevitable. Another way of interpreting it is that they make the threat credible.
And that then is the problem with threats - you might have to carry them out. What if Saddam does not comply - what if there is an extended period of time made available for the weapons inspectors, what if Saddam engineers their exit as he did before? The threat has to be carried out.

But the question then arises - by whom? My strongly held view is that, under those circumstances, it is vital that a second resolution making plain what 'serious consequences' mean has to be agreed by the UN security Council. Any military action can only be contemplated under such conditions.

Some may say - well the UN Security Council is malleable - maybe some of its rotating members can be brought off with promises of aid, or whatever.

My answer is that the UN may be imperfect, its procedures may not be of the best, its institutions may not be the most effective, but it's the only United Nations we've got. It is the instrument of international legitimacy in what goes on in international relations, and we need to strengthen it rather than undermining it because it is not perfect. My view is that the UN mandate for crisis intervention should be strengthened, possibly ultimately with its own seconded forces: but to give up on the United Nations either because it doesn't quite do what the US wants, or conversely, because we suspect that it might be too prone to do what the Us wants is simply to tear it down as that international force for legitimacy. If there is to be conflict, then action under the auspices of the UN is essential to contemplate a serious post conflict reconstruction,

What should not be on the agenda now - and I have to say, looking at the statements that come out of the mouths of various members of the United states administration at various times causes me to vary in my degree of alarm that it may be - is unilateral action by the United States, with one or two other countries invited to go along for the ride.

I believe the British government is at present working hard to ensure that this does not happen. I believe they are also working hard to bring about, even now, an outcome to the crisis that is more or less peaceful.

But of course, we might, despite all this come up against a scenario that the United States declares that it has lost patience with the procedures of the United Nations, and wants to go it alone. It might then invite the UK to join in. What should we do? Well quite simply we should not join in, for all the reasons I have set out.

And I, of course may have a limited say in that process if it comes about. In response to questions about the role Parliament would play in the event of the likelihood of conflict, the Prime Minister has made it clear that, except in circumstances where an immediate response is required in the event, say, of an attack being mounted on the territories in which troops are presently stationed, a decision to enter into military conflict would be placed before Parliament for a debate and a vote. I welcome those assurances. I believe it is vital that this happens. There still remains, I think more than a prospect that UN resolution 1441 and whatever the number of a subsequent resolution is, or the imminent adoption of such a resolution, could bring about a peaceful end to the crisis. I fervently hope that is to be the outcome. I do not want this country to commit its troops to a conflict any more than does anybody else in this room.

But if a resolution had been adopted by the Security Council following the final breakdown of attempts at compliance, then I would vote for UK military involvement under the flag of the UN. If I were offered the opportunity to vote for Britain's participation in a solo United States adventure, then I would not vote for it, whip or no whip.

What do you think about this - email me and let me know